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Abstract
Theoretical models often assume the environment to be a normal good, irrespective
of one’s income. However, a priori, nothing prohibits an environmental good from being
normal for some individuals and inferior for others. We develop a conceptual framework
in which private consumption and an environmental public good act as substitutes or com-
plements for satisfying different needs. Subsequently, the environment can switch between
normal and inferior depending on one’s income and environment. If the environment is in-
ferior for some range of income, then the willingness to pay for environmental preservation
becomes non-monotonic, thereby having implications for benefit transfers.
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1 Introduction
Is the environment a normal, inferior, or luxury good?1 This question is crucial to assess the
need for environmental protection and the design of prevention policies.
There is extensive debate on how the environment should be categorized. Empirical ev-
idence suggests that the willingness to pay (WTP) for the environment increases with in-
come, characterizing the environment as either a normal good (e.g., Kristrom and Riera, 1996;
Horowitz and McConnell, 2003; Jacobsen and Hanley, 2009; Tyllianakis and Skuras, 2016) or a
luxury good (e.g., Martini and Tiezzi, 2014; Tyllianakis and Skuras, 2016).2 When no positive
income effect on the WTP is found in an empirical study, concerns are usually raised about the
construct validity of the stated preference method (Bishop and Boyle, 2017). However, “how
concerned one should be about [the] lack of an income effect in individual studies is a matter
of judgment [...] the good being valued could be an inferior good or simply neutral with re-
spect to income” (ibid., p. 480). As the income effect on the WTP varies across income ranges
(Ready et al., 2002; Barbier et al., 2017), and most studies have been carried out in developed
countries (Drupp, 2018),3 the possibility that some environmental goods are inferior may have
been overlooked. However, a negative income effect emerges in certain evaluation studies.4
Huhtala (2010) and Vo and Huynh (2017) interpret the negative sign of the income effect they
find regarding recycling and groundwater protection programs, respectively, as evidence of the
inferiority of the environmental goods they study. When the environment is considered an in-
ferior good, the WTP for environmental protection decreases with a rise in income, thereby
leading to a conflict between economic development and environmental preservation.
An assumption of normality is often made, either explicitly or implicitly, in theoretical
models on the WTP for environmental goods, through the properties of the utility function.5
Although some models (e.g., Kotchen, 2005) may assume inferiority instead of normality, the
two categories cannot coexist—the environmental good is either normal or inferior. However,
it is not necessary ex ante that an environmental good “must be normal or inferior in all ranges
of income, and cannot switch back and forth. While it may seem improbable that poor people
choose clean environments, middle-income people prefer to trade clean environments for other
goods, and rich people prefer clean environments, no economic fundamentals would be vio-
lated by such a pattern” (Tiezzi and Martini, 2014, p.14). To date, however, such a variation in
1Our analysis can be generalized to other public goods.
2Following Flores and Carson (1997) and Ebert (2003), the environmental good is considered normal (luxury)
if the WTP increases less (more) than proportional to the income. Likewise, an environmental good is considered
inferior if the WTP decreases with income.
3In their meta-analysis on the WTP for biodiversity, Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) mainly identify studies from
developed countries. While 112 studies of their sample have been conducted in Europe, North America, and Aus-
tralia, only 33 studies have been conducted in developing countries, including Africa, Asia, and South America.
The meta-analyses of Schläpfer (2006) and Horowitz and McConnell (2003) mostly refer to studies in developed
countries. Kristrom and Riera (1996) find a positive income effect on the WTP based on European datasets.
4In their meta-analysis, Horowitz and McConnell (2003, footnote 2) report that about 5 percent of the studies
find such an effect in their sample.
5For example, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility implies normality, as shown in Appendix A.3.
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preferences has not been encompassed within a single microeconomic theoretical framework.
In our study, we develop a conceptual framework in which the categorization of environ-
mental goods as luxury, normal, or inferior can vary with the context, defined both with respect
to income and environmental quality. Our contribution is twofold. First, by allowing the in-
come elasticity of the WTP to vary across both income and environmental quality ranges, we
extend the theoretical literature that examines how this elasticity varies in different ranges of
income only (e.g., Barbier et al., 2017). Second, our study is the first, to the best of our knowl-
edge, to propose an endogenous categorization of environmental goods in which the income
elasticity of the WTP can be negative over some ranges of income and environmental quality,
thereby allowing the environment to be an inferior good in certain contexts. This framework
offers interesting perspectives when it comes to benefit transfers, the most commonly applied
non-market valuation technique (Johnston et al., 2015). The transfer of an estimated WTP for
a specific environmental good from one region to another must consider the contingency that
the environmental good is categorized differently in the two regions. If the adjustment of the
estimated WTP in the former region does not allow for potential inferiority of the good in the
latter region, then benefit transfer might be distorted, resulting in incorrect policy recommen-
dations. Given the common practice of benefit transfers that assume an unit income elasticity
of the WTP (Barbier et al., 2017; Czajkowski et al., 2017), the WTP would be misestimated if
the environment is perceived as an inferior good in the recipient region.
Let us describe our methodology. We consider a consumer problem in which the environ-
ment is a public good, and thus, exogenously given. This public good can be local and vary
over space, implying that individuals are faced with different contexts in terms of income and
environment. We use climate change as an illustrative example. Climate change affects local
climates, which are local public goods. For simplicity, we will illustrate our theoretical results
assuming that climate change reduces the quality of local climates.6
First, we establish that the categorization of environmental goods is intricately linked to
Edgeworth-Pareto (E-P) substitutability.7 Inferiority can only prevail if income and environ-
mental quality are substitutes, that is, if the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases
with income. This is in line with Vo and Huynh (2017), who claim that the existence of sub-
stitutes to groundwater protection programs in Vietnam, such as tap water, reduces consumers’
WTP for these programs with an increase of their income. We use this result to show that the
6Few locations may not fit this assumption. For example, in extreme northern latitudes, climate change can
benefit countries in terms of expanding agriculture and reducing energy expenditure (Arent et al., 2014; Costinot
et al., 2016).
7There are various definitions of substitutability between goods. Refer to Samuelson (1974) for an overview
of these definitions. Throughout the study, we use the term substitutability with italicized letters when referring
to the terminology, thereby encompassing both substitutability and complementarity. We always refer to E-P
substitutability, unless stated otherwise.
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widely used CES utility function8 and its derivatives imply complementarity (i.e., the marginal
utility of environmental quality increases with income), which means that environmental public
goods are bound to be normal or luxury goods in such frameworks.
To avoid this limitation, we develop a theoretical framework that allows substitutability
between income and environmental quality, henceforth indirect substitutability,9 to vary across
contexts. This framework is built upon the ideas that (i) individuals have different needs or
desires, which can be satisfied by combining environmental and private goods, and that (ii) the
two types of goods may interact differently for satisfying different needs. For example, goods
can be complements for the satisfaction of some needs and substitutes for others. Having
different interactions between goods for satisfying different needs implies that, depending on
how the relative importance of the needs changes across contexts, the indirect substitutability
can change too. The relationship between income and environmental quality could switch from
substitutability to complementarity and vice-versa when the context changes. Subsequently, the
categorization of environmental goods as normal, luxury, or inferior may vary over a range of
income and environmental qualities.
We can illustrate this framework with an example of the quality of the local climate. The
quality of the local climate interacts with private goods for satisfying different needs. For
example, in the case of housing, when adaptation solutions are available at a cost, private
expenditures and the quality of the local climate act as substitutes for facilitating good living
conditions. For other needs, such as recreational activities, the quality of the local climate can
act as a complement to private consumption. Depending on their needs, different individuals
may value a marginal change in the climate quality differently. When needs depend on the
context (income and the local climate), the categorization of the climate as a normal or an
inferior environmental public good can change along with the context. Therefore, the WTP for
the mitigation of climate change may change non-monotonically with a change in the income.
While considering that the satisfaction of every need partly relies on environmental quality,
we distinguish the case in which the overall private consumption contributes to the satisfaction
of all needs from the case in which different private goods specifically contribute toward the sat-
isfaction of each need. When private goods are need-specific, a hierarchy of needs can occur,
with clear-cut implications in terms of substitutability. In both cases, we illustrate our con-
ceptual framework with utility functional forms that exhibit context-dependent substitutability.
Both negative and positive income effects on the WTP are allowed, depending on the con-
text. For example, for some parameters of the functions, an environmental good is normal for
very low levels of income corresponding to the satisfaction of basic needs. The environmental
good becomes an inferior good for higher but still relatively low-income levels and, eventually
switches back to normality for higher-income levels. A similar pattern occurs over the range of
8Refer to Flores and Carson (1997), Ebert (2003) or Baumgärtner et al. (2017a) for applications.
9Indirect substitutability refers to the substitutability between income and environmental quality within the
indirect (maximized) utility function, and not to the substitutability between goods within the utility function.
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environmental quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies the link between
the income effect on the WTP and the substitutability between income and environmental qual-
ity, thereby drawing implications for the categorization of environmental public goods. It also
discusses this link in relation to what has been done in the theoretical literature. Section 3
introduces our proposal of context-dependent substitutability based on needs. Section 4 dis-
cusses the results and implications of our framework. The Appendix gathers the proofs and
mathematical details.
2 Substitutability and the categorization of environmental goods
We first establish the links between Substitutability and the categorization of environmental
goods in the standard framework, without referring to needs.
Consider a consumer whose utility U is derived from (i) private consumption c and (ii)
the public environmental quality E. For now, we consider a single consumption good; this
assumption will be relaxed in subsection 3.2.
Notations The set of strictly positive real numbers is denoted by R∗+ =]0,+∞). Subscripts
are used to denote function derivatives, for example, for the utility function we write Ui ≡ ∂U∂ i
and Ui j ≡ ∂ 2U∂ i∂ j for i, j ∈ {c,E}.
Assumption 1 The utility function U :R∗2+ 7−→R is continuous and twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, and concave in each of its arguments, i.e., Ui > 0 and Uii ≤ 0 for i ∈ {c,E}.
Most environmental goods are non-market goods, and environmental quality is a public rather
than a private good. Essentially, it cannot be chosen by the consumer and is considered ex-
ogenous to the problem of utility maximization (Ebert, 2003). The objective of the consumer
is to maximize own utility U(c,E) by choosing consumption c, subject to a budget constraint
depending on the given price p and income Y and the given environmental quality E. As Y
and E are both exogenous to the consumer, we define the context of consumption choices as
follows.
Definition 1 (Context) The context is defined as the endowment of the consumer in terms of
both income and environmental quality, that is, (Y,E) ∈ R∗2+ .
Given context (Y,E) and price p, the following optimization problem defines the indirect (max-
imized) utility
V (Y,E, p) = max
c
U(c,E) s.t. pc = Y and E fixed. (1)
Denoting the demand function derived from this problem by c∗(Y,E, p), indirect utility can be
expressed as
V (Y,E, p) =U(c∗(Y,E, p),E) . (2)
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In the simple case of an aggregate consumption good, whenever Uc > 0, we have c∗ = Y/p at
the optimum, and thus V (Y,E, p) =U(Y/p,E).
When dealing with a public good, one can determine the value attributed to this non-market
good by measuring the WTP of an individual for the increased supply of this good. The WTP
to improve environmental quality by ∆E is a utility-constant measure defined as the variation
in income necessary to compensate for the variation in environmental quality:10
V (Y,E, p) =V (Y −WT P, E +∆E, p). (3)
Eq. (3) states that a consumer whose preferences are represented by U is indifferent be-
tween (i) giving up from her budget the amount WT P(= ∆Y ) for improving environmental
quality by ∆E > 0 and (ii) remaining in the initial situation (i.e., no change in income and no
environmental improvement). As the utility function is differentiable, we can establish that the
WTP is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between income and environmental quality
weighted by the marginal environmental change dE:
WT P(Y,E, p) =
VE
VY
dE . (4)
This marginal WTP corresponds to the Lindahl price.11
2.1 Categorization of environmental public goods
The categorization of an environmental good as normal or inferior depends on the sign of the
income effect ∂WT P∂Y , that is, how the WTP varies with income. This effect is empirically studied
through the income elasticity of the WTP,
εWT P =
∂WT P
WT P
∂Y
Y
=
∂WT P
∂Y
Y
WT P
, (5)
which has the same sign as the income effect since Y > 0 and WT P > 0. We categorize envi-
ronmental goods as inferior, normal, or luxury according to the value of the income elasticity
of the WTP (Flores and Carson 1997; Ebert 2003).12
10We consider the compensating variation as the Hicksian measure of welfare.
11Given the level of environmental quality E, the Lindahl price is the WTP for an additional unit or a unitary
improvement in environmental quality.
12There is a debate about whether the income elasticity of demand or the income elasticity of the WTP for
environmental services is the best indicator to categorize an environmental good as normal or luxury. While the
former elasticity informs about the categorization of private goods, by definition, we follow Flores and Carson
(1997) and Ebert (2003), who consider that the latter provides better information about the categorization of
environmental public goods.
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Definition 2 (Categorization of environmental goods) An environmental good is
• inferior if the WTP for increasing the environmental good decreases with income (εWT P <
0);
• normal if the WTP for increasing the environmental good increases less than proportional
to the income (0 < εWT P < 1); and
• luxury if the WTP for increasing the environmental good increases more than propor-
tional to the income (εWT P > 1).
Typically, the empirical literature finds 0 < εWT P < 1 (Kristrom and Riera, 1996; Flores
and Carson, 1997; Barton, 2002; Jacobsen and Hanley, 2009; Wang et al., 2013). This means
that the environment is a normal good. An income elasticity of the WTP that is greater than 1
refers to environmental goods considered a luxury, as found by Tiezzi and Martini (2014) for
air quality and partly by Tyllianakis and Skuras (2016) for the restoration of the good ecological
status of water bodies. A negative income elasticity implies the inferiority of the good. While
this categorization was underrepresented in the literature a few years ago, and rarely interpreted
(e.g., McFadden and Leonard, 1993; McFadden, 1994; Horowitz and McConnell, 2003), em-
pirical evidence on inferiority has recently grown (e.g., Huhtala, 2010; Onanuga, 2017; Vo and
Huynh, 2017).
2.2 Categorization of environmental goods and E-P substitutability
Let us now focus on the sign of the income effect on the WTP:
∂WT P
∂Y
=
∂
(
VE
VY
)
∂Y
dE =
VY EVY −VYYVE
V 2Y
dE, (6)
with dE > 0. Our assumptions on the utility function (Assumption 1) imply VY > 0, VE > 0,
and VYY ≤ 0. The cross-derivative VY E captures how the marginal utility of income changes
when environmental quality increases and vice versa. This is the only element in eq. (6) whose
sign is not determined by our assumptions.
By deriving eq. (2) with respect to income Y and environmental quality E, we can study the
components of the cross-derivative of indirect utility:
VY E = c∗Y EUc+ c
∗
Y [c
∗
EUcc+UcE ] . (7)
The cross-derivative of the indirect utility is related to the derivatives and cross-derivative of the
utility function as well as to the response of the demand function c∗ to changes in the context
(Y,E). As we consider an environmental public good, E is provided in a fixed quantity for
free and does not affect the budget. Consumption is not affected by a change in environmental
quality, and we have c∗ = Y/p, and thus c∗Y = 1/p, c∗E = 0, and c∗Y E = 0. Therefore, eq. (7) is
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reduced to VY E =UcE/p.13
The cross-derivative of a utility function gives information on the substitutability between
goods according to the Edgeworth-Pareto (E-P) definition (Samuelson, 1974).
Definition 3 (E-P substitutability) The E-P substitutability between goods c and E relies on
the sign of the cross-partial derivative of the utility function as follows:
UcE < 0 c and E are substitutable;
UcE > 0 c and E are complementary;
UcE = 0 c and E are independent.
Goods are considered substitutes (complements) if environmental quality decreases (increases)
the marginal utility of consumption. The substitutability between goods is inherent to con-
sumer preferences and depends on the characteristics of the utility function. By extension,
substitutability between income and the environment can be defined with respect to the indirect
(maximized) utility as follows.
Definition 4 (Indirect substitutability) The substitutability between income Y and environ-
mental quality E relies on the sign of the cross-partial derivative VY E of indirect utility. The
income and environmental quality are substitutable when VY E < 0, independent when VY E = 0,
and complementary when VY E > 0.
Thus, the sign of the cross-derivative VY E of indirect utility exclusively depends on the sign of
the cross-derivative UcE of the utility function, leading to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Indirect substitutability with a public good) Whenever the environment is a
public good, and there is a single consumption good, the income and environmental quality are
complements (substitutes) if and only if consumption and environmental quality are comple-
ments (substitutes). Formally,
∀ Y,E > 0

VY E > 0⇔UcE(c∗,E)> 0
VY E < 0⇔UcE(c∗,E)< 0
VY E = 0⇔UcE(c∗,E) = 0.
Therefore, indirect substitutability only relies on the substitutability between goods when envi-
ronmental quality is a public good.14
13Eq. (7) makes it possible to study the more general case in which an environmental change affects the overall
consumption. This could be the case when the environment affects income (e.g., through labor productivity),
consumption good price (e.g., through production costs), or is framed as an environmental market-like good
(e.g., through taxation or fees). In Appendix A.1, we study the interplay between indirect and between-good
substitutabilities, as described in eq. (7), when the elasticities are not nil.
14We relax the assumption of a single consumption good in section 3.2, which results in a link between indirect
substitutability and the substitutability between goods that is more subtle.
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Now, we can discuss the link between the income effect on the WTP and indirect sub-
stitutability, and thus between the categorization of public goods and indirect substitutability.
From eq. (6), as VY > 0, VE > 0, and VYY ≤ 0, a positive income effect on the WTP would
occur either if income and environmental quality are substitutes or complements, whereas a
negative income effect on the WTP would occur only if income and environmental quality are
substitutes. This result is formalized in Proposition 2 (proof in Appendix A.2).
Proposition 2 (Inferior public goods and indirect substitutability) A necessary condition for
a negative income effect on the WTP, that is, for an environmental public good to be inferior,
is that income and environmental quality are substitutes. This condition is necessary and suffi-
cient if marginal utility of income is constant.
Tab. I summarizes the three possible cases and single impossible case emerging from Proposi-
tion 2.
Table I: Link between indirect substitutability and income effects
Positive income effect
(normality/luxury)
Negative income effect
(inferiority)
Indirect substitutability Case (1): possible Case (2):possible
Indirect complementarity Case (3): possible Case (4): not possible
While indirect complementarity imposes positive income effect on the WTP, indirect sub-
stitutability can lead to both negative and positive income effects. When would a negative effect
occur? When would an environmental public good be inferior? According to eq. (6), it occurs
when VEYVE <
VYY
VY
≤ 0, that is, when an additional unit of income reduces relatively more the
marginal utility of the environment than the marginal utility of income. In this case, one values
an environmental improvement less, which leads to a negative income effect (Case (2)). For ex-
ample, if private consumption and the quality of the local climate are substitutable enough (i.e.,
if VEY is sufficiently negative), then an increase in income may reduce the WTP to mitigate
climate change. Conversely, if an additional unit of income decreases one’s marginal utility
of income relatively more than it decreases the marginal utility of the environment (formally,
when VYYVY <
VEY
VE
≤ 0), then one would value income less when compared to an improvement in
environmental quality, leading to a positive income effect (Case (1)). The same effect occurs
in the complementarity case (Case (3)) in which an additional unit of income increases the
marginal utility of the environment (with VYYVY ≤ 0 <
VEY
VE
). In that case, the environment is never
an inferior good.
The empirical literature on demand analysis has long acknowledged the possibility that
the category of a good may change with income (Lewbel and Houthakker, 2017). Likewise,
with the WTP issues, Tiezzi and Martini (2014) argue that environmental goods should not
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be restricted to one category across all income ranges. The theoretical models studying envi-
ronmental goods do not allow the categorization of the environment to vary with the context.
The most commonly used utility functions, such as the CES function (Flores and Carson, 1997;
Ebert, 2003; Baumgärtner et al., 2017a), even imply indirect complementarity and thus normal-
ity (Case (3) in Tab. I only).15 To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical framework
that makes it possible for an environmental good to switch among Cases (1), (2), and (3) in
Tab. I with the change in context.
We propose a theoretical framework that is flexible enough to allow for the categorization
of public goods to vary across the context (i.e., with the income and environmental quality),
and even to cover the case discussed in the introduction in which a good would switch from
normal to inferior and to normal again when income increases.
3 Context-dependent substitutability and needs
We consider that utility is derived from the satisfaction of different needs, or wants (Maslow,
1943).16
The satisfaction of every need is partially dependent on environmental quality; However,
the way the environment interacts with private goods for the satisfaction of needs may differ.
We show that if the environment is a substitute for private goods for the satisfaction of some
needs and a complement for the satisfaction of other needs, then the categorization of an envi-
ronmental public good can vary across the context. The environment may be an inferior good
for some income and environmental quality levels, while it will be a normal good in other
contexts.
We distinguish the case in which the overall private consumption contributes to the satis-
faction of all needs (subsection 3.1) from the case in which different private goods specifically
contribute to the satisfaction of different needs (subsection 3.2). The single-good case allows
us to link our framework to the literature and emphasize our contribution. From an empirical
perspective, this case is also relevant when considering aggregate income or consumption data,
15We provide an analysis of several utility functional forms in Appendix A.3. Extended CES utility functions,
such as those with a subsistence requirement (Baumgärtner et al., 2017b), are also analyzed.
16This approach echoes some of the classical aspects of both empirical and theoretical analyses of consumer
choices. In Engel’s work, expenditures for private goods are classified according to the wants they serve, and the
idea of a hierarchy in these wants is used to interpret the observed consumption patterns; however, without using
a theoretical model (Chai and Moneta, 2010). Engel’s curves are key to describing consumption patterns and
categorizing inferior goods. According to Chai and Moneta (2010), “the desirability of developing a theoretical
explanation for the shape of Engel curves based on a rich behavioral foundation has been duly noted in the
literature, but this issue has not been properly investigated since Engel’s time.” Our analysis provides a basis
to establish a theoretical framework to study preferences for public goods based on need satisfaction. In the
consumer theory of Lancaster (1966), utility is not derived from goods directly, but from their characteristics
through different activities combining the goods in different ways. Lipsey and Rosenbluth (1971) show that even
if all characteristics are valuable, a good may be inferior if it shares sufficient characteristics with a “superior”
good. A similar pattern occurs in our framework for environmental goods if activities are interpreted as actions
aimed at satisfying needs.
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that is, when no information on good-specific expenditures is available. The case of need-
specific consumption goods is more realistic but requires richer data on expenditures and their
purpose.
3.1 Need satisfaction with a single consumption good and the environment
We assume that the consumer derives utility from consumption and environmental quality
through the satisfaction of two needs, A and B. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only
two needs, but the framework can be extended to accomodate more than two needs. The satis-
faction of both the needs depends on the consumption of a private aggregate good c as well as
on environmental quality E. We start by considering a single (aggregate) consumption good to
match the literature and conceptual framework described in the previous section and Appendix
A.3 but relax this assumption in the next subsection.
Within Need A and Need B, the interaction between consumption c and environmental qual-
ity E can be different. For instance, private and environmental goods can be complements for
the satisfaction of Need A, while they would act as substitutes for the satisfaction of Need B.
Need satisfaction is represented by specific functions A(c,E) and B(c,E), encompassing the
interaction between goods for each need. We assume these functions to be increasing and con-
cave in each of their arguments, i.e, Ac > 0, Bc > 0, AE > 0, BE > 0, Acc ≤ 0, Bcc ≤ 0, AEE ≤ 0,
and BEE ≤ 0. For the sake of simplicity, we assume there are no interactions between the needs,
and that need satisfaction is measured in the same unit as utility. Utility can thus be expressed
as U(c,E) = A(c,E)+B(c,E). This specification provides clearer results.
For an environmental public good, the indirect utility function (eq. 2) is given by V (Y,E, p)=
U(Y/p,E) = A(Y/p,E)+B(Y/p,E). The associated indirect substitutability is given by
VY E =
1
p
UcE =
1
p
(AcE(Y/p,E)+BcE(Y/p,E)) . (8)
Thus, indirect substitutability depends on the between-good substitutability for satisfying both
the needs. If the environment and the private good interact in a different way for satisfying
the two needs and the magnitude of the two effects varies across the context, then the sign of
VY E may differ from one context to another, thereby making indirect substitutability context-
dependent. We can illustrate this idea with our example on the quality of the local climate.
Consider one basic need (e.g., housing) and an ancillary need (e.g., recreational activities).
On the one hand, the quality of the local climate and private consumption can reasonably be
perceived as substitutes to satisfy the basic need—higher total expenditures, associated with
better housing, enable individuals to adapt to climate change, acting as a substitute for a good
local climate. On the other hand, the quality of the local climate and private consumption can
be complements for recreational activities. For example, both a good local climate and suitable
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outdoor equipment are necessary for enjoying outdoor activities. While increasing the overall
consumption reduces the marginal utility of the quality of the local climate for satisfying the
need for housing, it can increase this marginal utility through higher-order needs. Depending
on the context (high or low income; high or low local climate quality), an increase in the quality
of the local climate through climate change mitigation can be perceived as a complement or a
substitute to income, depending on the prevalent need. Overall, in this example, low income
individuals would rather perceive the local climate and income as substitutes, resulting in either
normality or inferiority of the local climate (Cases (1) or (2) in Tab. I). Conversely, high income
individuals would experience complementarity between income and the local climate, resulting
in normality of the local climate (Case (3) in Tab. I).
To illustrate such a pattern, we provide an example of utility function with context-dependent
substitutability (CDS).
An example of a utility function with CDS Consider a utility function with the following
putative form.17 For any (c,E) ∈ R∗2+ ,
U(c,E) = cγEω − θ
cαEβ
, (9)
where θ > 0 and 0 < γ,ω,α,β < 1 are given parameters. For simplicity, we call it the CDS
utility function.
This function would correspond to the need-satisfaction functions A(c,E) = cγEω and
B(c,E) = − θ
cαEβ
. We have AcE = γωcγ−1Eω−1 > 0, meaning that the private good comple-
ments the environmental quality in satisfying Need A, whereas BcE =−θαβc−α−1E−β−1 < 0,
meaning that the private good acts as a substitute for environmental quality in satisfying Need
B.
Fig. 1 shows the indifference curves associated with the CDS utility function for a specific
combination of parameter values. The properties of function U are consistent with preferences
satisfying completeness, continuity, transitivity, and non-satiation. The preferences represented
by U are not homothetic. The cross-partial derivative of the CDS utility function is
UcE = AcE +BcE = γωcγ−1Eω−1−θαβc−α−1E−β−1 . (10)
As the first term in the sum is positive and the second term is negative, its sign depends on
the context, that is, on environmental quality and income levels. This allows us to derive the
indirect substitutability, which, for demand c∗(Y,E, p) = Y/p, depends on the context (values
17Other possible functions are U(c,E) = cγEω +θ ln(cα +Eβ ) and U(c,E) = cE− eθ−c−E .
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Figure 1: Indifference curves of the CDS utility function (α = β = γ = ω = 0.5 and θ = 100)
of Y and E) as follows, 
VY E < 0 ⇔ Y < K/E
ω+β
γ+α
VY E = 0 ⇔ Y = K/E
ω+β
γ+α
VY E > 0 ⇔ Y > K/E
ω+β
γ+α
where K = p
(
θ αγ
β
ω
) 1
γ+α is a constant.
Fig. 2 illustrates the indirect substitutability of the CDS utility function. For relatively
Figure 2: Substitutability for a CDS utility function with parameters α = β = γ = ω = 0.5 and
θ = 100, for different prices p. Y and E are substitutes in the gray area and complements in the
white area.
low values of environmental quality and/or income levels, income and environmental quality
are substitutable (the gray area). For higher values, income and environmental quality are
complementary (the white area). This pattern is particular to the CDS utility function. We do
not claim that this should be universal. The frontier between the areas covering substitutability
and complementarity depends on the price p of the private good. As p increases, the purchasing
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power decreases, which increases the size of the domain wherein income and the environment
substitute one for the other in the provision of utility.
CDS preferences exhibiting inferiority of the environment We derive the conditions under
which a negative income elasticity of the WTP is possible with the CDS specification, in line
with Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (Negative income elasticity of the WTP under CDS preferences) If αωβγ <
(γ+α−1)2
(γ+α+1)2 ,
then there will be contexts in which the income elasticity of the WTP will be negative (i.e.,
εWT P < 0).
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix A.4. This condition is satisfied for the following set
of parameters (among others): α = β = γ = 0.99 and ω = 0.01; in the case of these parameters,
the range of contexts for which the environment is an inferior good is large. Fig. 3 illustrates
this case.
The black curves with black labels in Fig. 3 indicate the levels of income elasticity. The
light green area illustrates the contexts for which the environment is an inferior good (negative
income elasticity of the WTP). The two dark green areas indicate contexts for which the envi-
ronment is a normal good (positive income elasticity of the WTP). The white curve indicates
the frontier between the substitutability and complementarity domains (i.e., V (Y,E)> 0 above
the curve and V (Y,E) < 0 below it). The income elasticity of the WTP can be negative only
when income and environmental quality are substitutes (Proposition 2). Thus, the CDS utility
function allows for a categorization of environmental goods that depends on the context.18
Heterogeneity of contexts In the case of the parameters of the CDS utility function used
in Fig. 3, different preferences toward the environment (WTP) coexist. We can interpret this
heterogeneity with our climate change example. Consider different regions that differ in terms
of the quality of the local climate and/or income, that is, different contexts. For simplicity, we
consider that the contexts denoted by (1) and (2) have a similar, lower local-climate quality
and differ only with respect to their income. Contexts (3), (4), and (5) share a similar, higher
local-climate quality and also differ only with respect to their income.
In the higher local-climate quality case, for individuals with an extremely low-income level,
as in context (3), the satisfaction of basic needs heavily relies on the climate quality, and the
environment is a normal good. An individual living in a house built with brittle materials may
be willing to pay more to mitigate climate change as the individual experiences a rise in income
(in this case, the climate is a normal good) rather than relying on a rise in expenditures, such as
18With the CES or extended CES utility function, the whole graph would be dark green. The income and
environmental quality would be complements in all contexts, and the environmental good would be a normal
good.
14
Figure 3: Income elasticity of the WTP under CDS preferences
superior quality building materials that provide an adaptation to climate change.19 In context
(4), with a similar local-climate quality, but a higher income, private consumption may cover
most of the basic needs, and an individual will have a low dependence on the environmental
substitute. As income increases, the individual would exhibit a low WTP for the environment,
and the WTP for climate-change mitigation will decrease. The environmental good is inferior.
This could apply to an individual living in a strong house who may be willing to contribute less
to the climate-change mitigation as income rises because higher private expenditures provide
an adaptation to climate change. In context (5), corresponding to a high income, ancillary needs
19It may seem unrealistic that very low-income individuals would be willing to pay (monetarily) for climate
change mitigation. However, in tribal economies, the extremely low income of native people and their high
willingness to protect the environment (see UN Environment Article) leads to a consideration of the WTP beyond
its proper monetary definition. The non-monetary WTP can take various forms, such as spending time protecting
the environment or engaging in benevolent communication in favor of environmental protection .
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may prevail and income may act as a complement to the environment. Recreational activities
or self-fulfillment may require a good local climate and income. As higher income allows
for more private consumption of, say, outdoor equipment, the WTP for the climate-change
mitigation increases as income increases (normal good).
The magnitude of the income bracket for which there is a negative income effect on the
WTP varies with environmental quality. In Fig. 3, in regions characterized by lower environ-
mental quality (contexts (1) and (2)), inferiority of the environment occurs for a larger range
of income levels than in regions that have a better environmental quality (contexts (3), (4), and
(5)). The lower the environmental quality, the larger will be the income bracket for which there
is a negative income effect on the WTP. As environmental quality worsens, richer individu-
als are more likely to exhibit a negative income effect. With such preferences, countries with
poor environmental conditions may enter a vicious circle, when the environmental degradation
resulting from growth and increasing income induces an overall diminishing WTP for envi-
ronmental preservation. Certainly, these interpretations are specific to some parameters of the
CDS utility functional form. Altogether, such a utility function could represent situations in
which a negative income effect on the WTP would occur more in low-income countries, and
would have a higher likelihood of occurrence when environmental quality is low.
Benefit transfers Our results indicate that the benefit transfer method should be used with
caution. When there are contexts in which the environment is an inferior good, applying a unit
constant income elasticity to transfer environmental benefits, a widespread practice (Barbier
et al., 2017; Czajkowski et al., 2017), can lead to misestimation.
When the environment is an inferior good for some range of income, the WTP is non-
monotonic and decreases for that range. Fig. 4 and 5 represent the marginal environmental
WTP as a function of income for the two levels of environmental quality discussed previously.20
On both figures, the pattern is similar. The WTP first increases with income, then decreases,
and, finally, rises again as income increases.
Figure 4: Marginal WTP as a function of
income - Lower environmental quality
Figure 5: Marginal WTP as a function of
income - Higher environmental quality
20The axes in Fig. 4 and 5 have the same scale and ensure that the marginal WTP can directly be compared
across the two figures. Compared to Fig. 3, we extended the range of income to discuss further interesting cases.
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Consider benefit transfers among different contexts tagged in Fig. 3.21 Applying a unit in-
come elasticity, with the underlying assumption of normality, would lead to estimating a higher
WTP in richer contexts and a lower WTP in poorer contexts when compared to the reference
site. For example, the WTP in context (2) would be estimated higher than in the poorer context
(1), whereas Fig. 4 illustrates that this is not the case for CDS preferences exhibiting inferiority
across a range of income. A similar misestimation occurs between contexts (4) and (5) in Fig. 5.
This is due to the fact that, within a range of income wherein the environment is perceived as
an inferior good, poorer individuals value the environment more than richer individuals do.
Such a misestimation would occur mainly when the two sites are characterized by contexts
positioned on different sides of an income-effect border (light green/dark green in Fig. 3), even
when the study sites are relatively similar in terms of income and environmental quality, one of
the ideal criteria for the use of benefit transfers (Richardson et al., 2015). When the difference
in income of the two sites is large and covers mainly incomes for which the environment is a
normal good, a standard benefit transfer may not lead to an incorrect income effect but would
still result in an error of the magnitude of the effect. This is illustrated by the overall positive
income effect between context (4) and the richer context (6) in Fig. 5.
Therefore, with non-monotonic WTP profiles, using the common practices of benefit trans-
fer could result in a misestimation of the WTP, either in the direction or the magnitude. In
certain cases, the direction may be right, and the magnitude distorted (e.g., between contexts
(4) and (6)). In other cases, both the direction and magnitude may be distorted (e.g., between
contexts (1) and (2)). The misestimation may be even stronger if the two regions are different
in both income and environmental quality (e.g., between contexts (1) and (5)).
Using a context-dependent income elasticity of the WTP would make it possible to ac-
count for the possibility that the environment is an inferior good in certain contexts, and help
policymakers prevent such transfer errors.
3.2 Need satisfaction with need-specific consumption goods and the environ-
ment
Assuming a single aggregate consumption good as in subsection 3.1 amounts to assuming that
the consumer will purchase the same bundle of commodities, irrespective of the given income
or environmental quality levels. If the interplay between private goods and the environment
depends on the context, then the type of goods purchased will also depend on the context. In
fact, if goods are purchased to satisfy different needs that have relative importance, then income
would more likely be devoted to the purchase of goods that contribute to the satisfaction of
the currently more urgent need. From this viewpoint, the assumption of a single composite
consumption good is restrictive.
In this section, we relax this assumption and consider the case in which different private
21Context (6) in Fig. 5 is not in the range of income depicted in Fig. 3.
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goods contribute to various needs differently. For simplicity, we consider two private goods,
each contributing to the satisfaction of one (and only one) of the needs. This is a simplified case
in which each private good has a single characteristic, as discussed in Lancaster (1966, p. 136–
137).22 The environment, however, is assumed to have two characteristics and contribute to
both the needs.
The private consumption associated with Need A is denoted by cA ∈ R+, and the private
consumption associated with Need B is denoted by cB ∈R+. The corresponding prices, denoted
by pA and pB, are given, finite, and positive (i.e., 0 < pA < ∞ and 0 < pB < ∞). Environmental
quality E contributes to the satisfaction of the two needs, possibly, in different ways.
The need-satisfaction functions are, respectively, denoted by A(cA,E) and B(cB,E) and
are assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. We assume that the need-satisfaction
functions satisfy the following assumptions: AcA > 0, AcAcA ≤ 0, AE > 0, AEE ≤ 0, BcB > 0,
BcBcB < 0, BE > 0, BEE ≤ 0.
Utility is denoted by U(cA,cB,E). For the sake of simplicity, we assume the separabil-
ity of needs and that need satisfaction is measured in the same unit as utility. This ensures
that U(cA,cB,E) = A(cA,E)+B(cB,E). Given the properties of A and B, the utility function
U(cA,cB,E) has the following properties:
• UcA(cA,cB,E)> 0 and UcAcA(cA,cB,E)≤ 0;
• UcB(cA,cB,E)> 0 and UcBcB(cA,cB,E)< 0;
• UE(cA,cB,E)> 0; UEE(cA,cB,E)≤ 0.
Our framework aims to capture consumer decisions in a given context. The objective of the
consumer is to maximize own utility, which depends on the satisfaction of the two needs, by
choosing the optimal consumption levels cA and cB, given the budget Y , prices pA and pB, and
environmental quality E.
V (Y,E, pA, pB) = max
cA,cB
U(cA,cB,E) (11)
s.t

pAcA+ pBcB ≤ Y ,
cA,cB ≥ 0 ,
given Y,E, pA, pB .
V is the indirect utility function, namely the optimal level of utility obtained in a context (Y,E)
and given prices (pA, pB).
22The specific goods can be thought of aggregate goods for each need, for example, a composite food basket,
on the one hand, and the rest of the economic goods, on the other hand, if one considers the first need to be
food consumption, as opposed to another ancillary need. The problem could also be set in terms of need-specific
expenditure by suppressing prices.
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Denoting the demand functions for the two private goods (which are implicitly defined by
the optimization problem (11)) by c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB) and c
∗
B(Y,E, pA, pB), the indirect utility can
be written as
V (Y,E, pA, pB) = A(c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB),E)+B(c
∗
B(Y,E, pA, pB),E) . (12)
The cross-partial derivative of this expression gives us indirect substitutability:
VY E =
(
AcAcA
∂c∗A
∂E
+AcAE
)
∂c∗A
∂Y
+AcA
∂c∗2A
∂Y∂E
+
(
BcBcB
∂c∗B
∂E
+BcBE
)
∂c∗B
∂Y
+BcB
∂c∗2B
∂Y∂E
. (13)
This expression depends on the substitutability between private goods and the environment for
both need satisfactions (i.e., AcAE and BcBE), in interaction with the response of demands to
changes in the context, particularly, with income Y . The term ∂c
∗
A
∂Y (resp.
∂c∗B
∂Y ) is proportional
to the share of marginal income allocated to the satisfaction of Need A (resp. B), with the
condition that marginal income is fully used, that is, pA
∂c∗A
∂Y + pB
∂c∗B
∂Y = 1 (from the budget
constraint). If marginal income is mainly allocated to the satisfaction of one of the needs, then
the substitutability of the associated private good with the environment for the satisfaction of
that need would influence indirect substitutability more than the substitutability of the other
private good with the environment for the satisfaction of the other need. The extreme case in
which marginal income is allocated to a single good (e.g., ∂c
∗
B
∂Y = 1/pB and
∂c∗A
∂Y = 0) provides an
intuitive discussion of eq. (13) and makes it possible to establish a direct link between indirect
substitutability and between-good substitutability for that need. Such behavior prevails when
there is a (partial) need hierarchy, a particular case we examine now.
A case with need hierarchy Consider a hierarchical behavior in the satisfaction of needs,
with Need B being of primary importance with respect to Need A. This would be the case if
Need B corresponds to basic needs and Need A to ancillary needs. A hierarchy of needs is
often related to quasi-lexicographic preferences in the literature, as presented in the transposi-
tion of Maslow’s theory of motivation in a utility maximization framework (e.g., Seeley, 1992).
However, imposing such restrictions on the optimization problem is unnecessary. Appendix
B provides simple properties that utility can satisfy and that induce (endogenous) hierarchical
behavior. A hierarchy simply emerges as a corner solution of a utility maximization problem
when the utility function satisfies such properties. This allows us to avoid imposing exogenous
thresholds for satiation (or for behavioral change, as in Baumgärtner et al., 2017b). Appendix B
describes the way the endogenous thresholds for behavioral changes are derived in our frame-
work. We refer to such thresholds below.
Let us describe a stylized hierarchical behavior in our framework. For some range of (low)
income, the marginal income is exclusively allocated to the satisfaction of the basic need B.
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For a higher range of income, marginal income is allocated to the satisfaction of both the
needs. For the remaining range of income, marginal income is exclusively allocated to the
satisfaction of the ancillary need A. The threshold below which marginal income is only allo-
cated to Need B, with c∗B =
Y
pB
and c∗A = 0, is denoted by Y (E, pA, pB). The threshold above
which additional income is only allocated to Need A, with c∗B = c¯B and c∗A =
Y−c¯B pB
pA
, where
c¯B is the maximum private consumption devoted to the satisfaction of Need B, is denoted by
Y (E, pA, pB) ≥ Y (E, pA, pB). Subsequently, the indirect utility function can be written as fol-
lows (dropping the arguments of the endogenous thresholds Y and Y ):
V (Y,E, pA, pB) =

U(0, YpB ,E) = B(
Y
pB
,E) if Y ≤ Y
U(c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB),c
∗
B(Y,E, pA, pB),E) if Y < Y ≤ Y
U(Y−c¯B pBpA , c¯B,E) = A(
Y−c¯B pB
pA
,E)+B(c¯B,E) if Y < Y
This leads to the following result for indirect substitutability23
VY E =

BcBE
pB
if Y < Y
Eq.(13) if Y < Y < Y
AcAE
pA
if Y < Y
In this case of (partial) hierarchy, indirect substitutability in the two extreme cases, which
correspond to the allocation of marginal income for purchasing a single good, relies on the
substitutability between goods for the satisfaction of the relevant need only. Consequently, in a
given environmental context E, two individuals with different income levels Y may exhibit dif-
ferent preferences for the environment because they allocate marginal income to the satisfaction
of different needs.
The thresholds Y and Y depend on environmental quality E (and on prices pA and pB).
Essentially, the income threshold at which behavior changes varies with a change in environ-
mental quality. We discuss this effect with an example.24
An example of a utility function with need hierarchy and CDS for two goods To illustrate
the previous results, we provide an example of a utility function based on the two needs, for
23The derivatives at the threshold levels Y and Y may not be well-defined. We discuss these cases in Appendix
B.1.
24Proposition 5 in Appendix B provides a general result on the links between such thresholds and on the sub-
stitutability between private goods and the environment for the satisfaction of both the needs.
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which there is a hierarchy with a prevalence25 of the basic need B for low-income levels and a
strong non-satiety26 of the ancillary need A.
For any (cA,cB,E) ∈ R∗3+ , consider the utility function
U(cA,cB,E) = cAEω − θcαB Eβ
(14)
with 0 < ω,α,β < 1, and θ > 0.
Here, Need A is such that, for any (cA,E) ∈ R∗2+ , A(cA,E) = cAEω , and Need B is such
that, for any (cB,E) ∈ R∗2+ , B(cB,E) = − θcαB Eβ . The cross-derivatives of the need-satisfaction
functions are AcAE =ωEω−1 > 0 and BcBE =−θαβc−α−1B E−β−1 < 0. Therefore, in this exam-
ple, there is complementarity between goods for the satisfaction of Need A and substitutability
between goods for the satisfaction of Need B.
For a given environmental quality E, the marginal utility derived from the consumption of
good cA is constant and equal to Eω . Regarding Need B, the marginal utility derived from
the consumption of good cB is BcB =
αθ
cα+1B E
β , which varies continuously and monotonically
from +∞ when the consumption of cB is nil to 0 when the consumption is infinite. Hence,
there is a consumption threshold cˆB under which marginal income has a higher marginal utility
when it is allocated to Need B and above which the marginal income should be allocated to
Need A only. This is the case of a pure hierarchy27 is described and resolved in Appendix
B. We denote the corresponding income threshold by Y¯ (E, pA, pB). This threshold is such
that UcA(0,
Y¯
pB
,E)/pA =UcB(0,
Y¯
pB
,E)/pB. Given that UcA(0,
Y
pB
,E) = Eω and UcB(0,
Y
pB
,E) =
αθE−β
( pB
Y
)α+1, its expression is as follows:
Y¯ (E, pA, pB) = pB
(
pA
pB
αθ
Eω+β
) 1
α+1
. (15)
Fig. 6 illustrates this case of a pure hierarchy for pA = pB = 1 to ease the visual interpretation.
Depending on the context (Y,E), additional income is either allocated to the satisfaction of
the basic need B (increase in cB) for low income, or the ancillary need A (increase in cA) for
a sufficiently large income. The income threshold Y¯ (E, pA, pB) at which behavior changes is
decreasing with environmental quality (see Proposition 5 in Appendix B). The intuition for this
pattern is as follows. As the environmental quality increases, the marginal utility of consump-
tion for the satisfaction of Need B decreases due to substitutability, whereas the marginal utility
25Roughly speaking, this means that income is allocated only to the basic Need B for low-income levels. Refer
to Appendix B for the formal definitions of this property.
26Roughly speaking, this means that marginal income is allocated only to the ancillary need A for high-income
levels. This does not mean that the basic need B is fulfilled and does not require absolute satiety of Need B. Refer
to Appendix B for the formal definition of these properties.
27‘Pure’ in the sense that there is a complete switch in behavior regarding the allocation of marginal income to
the two needs, contrary to the case of the partial hierarchy described before, wherein marginal income was allo-
cated to both goods for a range of income. When there is a pure hierarchy, the two previously defined thresholds,
Y and Y , merge.
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Figure 6: Utility from needs satisfaction in the case of pure hierarchy.
of consumption for the satisfaction of Need A increases due to complementarity. Expenditures
for the satisfaction of Need A start at a lower income level when there is an improvement in
environmental quality.
4 Discussion
The novelty of our framework lies in the conceptual link between needs and substitutability.
Depending on one’s needs, private consumption and environmental quality may act as sub-
stitutes or complements. The prevalence of a specific need in a given context of income and
environmental quality leads an individual to perceive income and the environment as either sub-
stitutes or complements. This indirect substitutability affects individual preferences regarding
the environment, that is, whether the individual is willing to pay more, or less, for environ-
mental improvements as income rises. First, concerning the theoretical literature on the WTP,
we offered a framework that endogenizes the categorization of environmental goods. This
framework allows us to address the lack of consideration of inferior environmental goods in
theoretical models. Second, we enriched the theoretical literature by considering an additional
dimension, environmental quality, which, beside income, influences the income elasticity of
the WTP. How the WTP for the environment increases with income may indeed be affected by
the status quo of the environment.
We provided utility functional forms that illustrate such a framework. The CDS utility func-
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tional form we scrutinized is one of the many examples. The interpretation of the underlying
preferences should not be considered universal, but rather as an illustration of the flexibility of
our framework. Our aim was to show that such a model with CDS allows for a variation in
the category of environmental goods depending on the income and environmental context of
individuals.
In this section, we discuss i) the implications of our approach and its relevance for envi-
ronmental benefit transfers, ii) suggestions for the empirical testing of our framework, and iii)
avenues for future research.
Implications for benefit transfers Benefit transfers constitute a promising tool to address the
increasing demand for ecosystem service valuation (Richardson et al., 2015). The challenge is
the degree of heterogeneity between the study site and the site to which the WTP is transferred
(Bateman et al., 2011). The usual guidelines applied rely on a constant (unit) income elasticity
of the WTP. This is supported by some research studies. For example, Czajkowski et al. (2017)
examine several transfer methods and conclude that unit income elasticity adjustments lead to
minimum transfer errors. Other studies continue to suggest improvements to or the sophistica-
tion of benefit transfer methods. For example, Barbier et al. (2017) recommend non-constant
income elasticities of the WTP. Other studies emphasize the need to account for substitutabil-
ity and scope effects28 (Bishop and Boyle, 2017; Richardson et al., 2015). Our framework
accounts for heterogeneity in two dimensions, income and environmental quality. Our first
message is that non-constant income elasticities should be considered in benefit transfers in
practice. Income elasticities may not only depend on income levels but also on environmen-
tal quality. In addition to the fact that the income effect can be bi-dimensional, two countries
with the same income may not exhibit the same WTP for an environmental good if their en-
vironmental status quo differ. The WTP needs not only be adjusted for income but also for
environmental quality levels. We focused on the income effect on the WTP because discussing
the categorization of environmental goods constituted our primary interest. Nonetheless, our
framework also offers insights on the environmental effect on the WTP.29 Similar to the study
on the income effect, our framework relates the environmental effect on the WTP with sub-
stitutability between income and the environment, which is in line with Amiran and Hagen
(2010). We can express the environmental elasticity of the WTP30 as εE = ∂WT PWT P /
∂E
E where
28The scope effect requires that both the status quo of environmental quality and the magnitude of the change
in the environmental good be accounted for when valuing the environment. In our framework, the status quo of
the environment is accounted for in the definition of the context.
29The environmental effect refers to the effect of a change of the environmental status quo (i.e., the current state
of the environment) on the WTP.
30As far as we know, few studies estimate the environmental elasticity of the WTP (e.g., Rollins and Lyke,
1998).
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the environmental effect is
∂WT P
∂E
=
∂
(
VE
VY
)
∂E
dE =
VEEVY −VY EVE
V 2Y
dE. (16)
Would two individuals with the same income but different environmental qualities be willing
to pay the same for environmental improvements? Intuitively, one might think that their con-
tribution might not be the same and that the WTP would decrease as environmental quality
improves. Nonetheless, a positive environmental effect can occur when income and environ-
mental quality are (sufficiently) substitutable. This would mean that individuals are willing to
pay more as environmental quality improves. Our framework makes it possible to study such
cases in which some individuals may be less willing to pay for environmental preservation as
environmental quality increases, while others may be more willing to pay for it, depending on
the context.
Importantly, and, as a second recommendation, considering all possible categorizations of
environmental goods is all the more relevant if one thinks about the current selection bias to-
ward relatively developed countries in the empirical literature (Drupp, 2018). While the catego-
rization of environmental goods as normal seems reasonable in relatively high-income contexts,
inferiority could arise from contexts depicting a conflict between development and environmen-
tal preservation. We could reasonably expect an increasing demand for ecosystem valuation in
developing countries in the future. By broadening the origins of the studies on environmental
valuation (i.e., by broadening the studied ranges of income as well as the environmental-quality
levels), negative income effects may emerge more often than is currently observed. We showed
that inferiority of the environment for some range of contexts can result in misestimation of
the WTP when applying standard benefit transfer methods. Therefore, there is a need to en-
rich benefit transfer methods to ensure that they fit every possible context of environmental
valuation and ensure a correct understanding of individual’s preferences for the environment.
Experimental testing While running an experiment is beyond the scope of our study, we
suggest two ways in which our conceptual framework can enrich experimental approaches
to environmental valuation. One way to evaluate the WTP for environmental improvement
is to decompose the environmental good into a set of attributes and assess preferences for
these attributes. This reflects the purpose behind the design of the discrete choice experiments.
Our framework suggests that the different attributes considered in these experiments may con-
tribute to the satisfaction of different needs. One interesting addition to the standard choice
experiments would be to explicitly account for different needs and evaluate how the different
attributes of the environment contribute to their satisfaction. If different individuals value these
attributes differently, it may be due to the prevalence of different needs, which can be explained
by the context of each individual (income and environmental quality). The environmental at-
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tributes that stand out would change from one context in which basic needs are prevalent to
another context in which higher-order needs are prevalent. Subsequently, we can relate the
environmental WTP to different needs, and therefore to specific attributes. Setting up such an
experiment requires the identification of two contexts in which prevalent needs are expected to
be different. This would make it possible to determine whether and to what extent need-specific
attributes drive the overall values of the WTP for the environment.
Another way to assess the relevance of our framework would be to design experiments that
estimate whether private and environmental goods are substitutes or complements. The manner
in which the marginal utility of income and the marginal utility of the environment change with
income determines the sign of the income effect on the WTP, and therefore the categorization
of the environmental good (see Proposition 2). The context of our research requires a cardinal
measure of utility.31 This echoes the reason behind the development of happiness studies. So
far, the curvature of utility has been estimated over a single dimension—income (e.g., Layard
et al., 2008). In our framework, one needs to characterize how the marginal utility of income
changes with income as well as with environmental quality, given that our context is bidimen-
sional. One way of measuring E-P substitutability would be to identify several contexts with the
same level of income but different environmental quality levels (other aspects, such as culture,
should be controlled). This would be done for different strata of income. This will facilitate
the estimation of the marginal utility of income in these different study sites and determine if
the estimates vary from one site to another, as predicted by our framework.
Avenues for future research Besides empirical testing, several extensions of our framework
may be of interest for future research. First, we considered environmental public goods. Relax-
ing the non-rivalry property would allow us to discuss common pool resources and enable us to
include a larger variety of environmental goods in our examples. Second, our framework could
be relevant in a dynamic context. Given the evolution of income and environmental quality,
how the environmental WTP varies over time and how it is affected by changes in income and
environmental quality can be assessed through the following equation, where the dots refer to
derivatives with respect to time:
˙WT P
WT P
=
dWT P
WT P
dY
Y
Y˙
Y
+
dWT P
WT P
dE
E
E˙
E
,
in which ˙WT PWT P is the growth rate of the WTP,
Y˙
Y is the income growth rate, and
E˙
E is the environ-
mental growth rate (Horowitz, 2002). In a dynamic version of our framework, substitutability
could change over time, potentially leading to different categorization of the environment over
time. A shock to the economy or the environment may lead to a significant change in the WTP.
Such a dynamic model could be used to extend the literature on the environmental Kuznets
31E-P substitutability is per se a cardinal object (Samuelson, 1974).
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curve that mostly relies on additive preferences (Figueroa and Pastén, 2015), and thus assumes
normality of the environment.
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Appendices
A Proof of propositions and supplementary material
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The indirect utility is the maximum obtainable utility in a given context (Y,E), for a given price
p:
V (p,Y,E) =U(c∗(Y,E, p),E) . (17)
The first derivative of V with respect to Y is
VY = c∗Y (Y,E, p)Uc(c
∗(Y,E, p),E) . (18)
Deriving VY with respect to E yields the cross-derivative of the indirect utility
VY E = c∗Y E(Y,E, p)Uc(c
∗(Y,E, p),E)+ c∗Y (Y,E, p) [c
∗
E(Y,E, p)Ucc(c
∗(Y,E, p),E)+UcE(c∗(Y,E, p),E)] . (19)
By simplifying notations, we get
VY E = c∗Y EUc+ c
∗
Y [c
∗
EUcc+UcE ] . (20)
To prove Proposition 1, we rely on the following Corollary, which characterizes the interplay
between indirect and between-good substitutabilities in terms of elasticities, when a change
in the environmental quality influences the demand for the consumption good. The proof of
Corollary 1 is provided at the end of this section, after interpretations.
Corollary 1 (Indirect and between-good substitutabilities) How indirect substitutability re-
lates to the substitutability between goods depends on the demand-related cross-elasticities
and the elasticity of marginal utility for consumption as follows:
VY E > 0⇔ ηc,E < Y,E − c,E ηc,c
VY E < 0⇔ ηc,E > Y,E − c,E ηc,c
VY E = 0⇔ ηc,E = Y,E − c,E ηc,c ,
with c,E= ∂c
∗
c∗ /
∂E
E as the elasticity of demand with respect to the environment,
Y,E=
∂c∗Y
c∗Y
/∂EE as the elasticity of marginal consumption with respect to the environment,
ηc,c = ∂UcUc /
∂c
c = −cUccUc as the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to
consumption, and
ηc,E = ∂UcUc /
∂E
E =−E UcEUc as the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to the
environment.
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The elasticity ηc,E indicates substitutability (complementarity) between goods if it is positive
(negative). Therefore, income and environmental quality are complements (substitutes) if and
only if consumption and environmental quality are sufficiently complementary (substitutes).
Put differently, substitutability (complementarity) between goods does not always imply in-
direct substitutability (complementarity). It depends on the value of the demand-related cross-
elasticities and elasticities of marginal utility. In the case of an environmental public good,
however, we have Y,E= 0 and c,E= 0, which leads to
VY E > 0⇔ ηc,E < 0
VY E < 0⇔ ηc,E > 0
VY E = 0⇔ ηc,E = 0.
Therefore, as ηc,E has the same sign as Uc,E , between-good substitutability (complementarity)
implies indirect substitutability (complementarity), as stated in Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1 The evaluation of the sign of the cross-derivative of the indirect utility
gives:
VY E > 0⇔ c∗Y EUc+ c∗Y [c∗EUcc+UcE ]> 0 (21)
⇔ c∗Y EUc >−c∗Y [c∗EUcc+UcE ] (22)
⇔ c
∗
Y E
c∗Y
>−c∗E
Ucc
Uc
−UcE
Uc
(23)
⇔ c∗E c
∗
Y E
c∗Y
>−c∗Ec∗E
Ucc
Uc
− c∗EUcE
Uc
(24)
⇔ c∗
(
E
c∗Y E
c∗Y
)
> Ec∗E
(
−c∗Ucc
Uc
)
+ c∗
(
−EUcE
Uc
)
(25)
⇔
(
E
c∗Y E
c∗Y
)
> E
c∗E
c∗
(
−c∗Ucc
Uc
)
+
(
−EUcE
Uc
)
(26)
VY E > 0⇔Y,E>c,E ηc,c+ηc,E . (27)
Similarly, we get
VY E < 0⇔Y,E<c,E ηc,c+ηc,E , (28)
VY E = 0⇔Y,E=c,E ηc,c+ηc,E . (29)
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We remind that WT P = VEVY dE and that ε
WT P = ∂WT P∂Y
Y
WT P . The WTP for a one-unit improve-
ment in environmental quality is denoted by w = VEVY . From Eq. (6), we get
εWT P < 0⇔ ∂WT P
∂Y
< 0 (30)
⇔VY EVY −VYYVE < 0 (31)
⇔VY E < VEVY VYY (32)
⇔VY E < w VYY . (33)
As VY > 0 and VE > 0, one has w > 0. Given that VYY ≤ 0, we obtain VY E < 0.
Conversely,
εWT P > 0⇔VY E > w VYY . (34)
A.3 Implicit assumptions on substitutability in common utility functional forms
In this section, we analyze the implications of common utility functions on the categorization of
environmental goods. While empirical studies discuss whether environmental goods are normal
or luxury goods, the theoretical literature is based on strong (often implicit) assumptions about
indirect substitutability and therefore on the categorization of environmental goods.
The CES utility function The CES utility function is widely used in microeconomic mod-
els to deal with the income elasticity of the WTP (Flores and Carson, 1997; Ebert, 2003;
Baumgärtner et al., 2017a). Formally, this utility function is expressed as follows:
UCES(c,E) =
(
a c1−
1
σ +b E1−
1
σ
) σ
σ−1
, (35)
where 0 < a < 1 is the weight given to consumption, 0 < b < 1 (generally equal to 1− a)
is the weight given to environmental quality, and σ > 0 is the Hicks elasticity of substi-
tution between c and E. Solving the consumer problem (Eq. (1)) with the CES function
(max UCES(c,E) s.t. pc = Y and E fixed) leads to the following indirect utility function:
VCES(Y,E, p) =
(
a
(
Y
p
)1− 1σ
+b E1−
1
σ
) σ
σ−1
, (36)
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whose cross-derivative is always positive,
VCESY E (Y,E, p) =
ab
(
Y
p
) 1
σ
E
1
σ
(
a
(
Y
p
)1− 1σ
+bE1−
1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(
aYp E
1
σ +b
(
Y
p
) 1
σ
E
)2
σ
> 0. (37)
While the CES utility function is a good choice to assess (i) benefit incidence, that is,
whether the distribution of environmental benefits is pro-poor or pro-rich (Ebert, 2003) and
(ii) income inequality (Baumgärtner et al., 2017a), it fails to encompass the negative income
effects that allow for inferior goods. Ebert (2003) shows that the income elasticity of the WTP
is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution. Thus, if the elasticity of substitution is
greater (smaller) than one, then the environmental good would be considered a normal (luxury)
good. Since the elasticity of substitution is always positive, there is no possibility of inferiority
of environmental goods with the CES utility function.
The extended CES utility function The following extension of the CES utility function, with
a subsistence requirement, which is described by Heal (2009), has been studied by Baumgärtner
et al. (2017b).
UextCES(c,E) =
{
U l(E) for E ≤ E
Uh(c,E) else
where
Uh(c,E) =
(
a c1−
1
σ +b (E−E)1− 1σ
) σ
σ−1
. (38)
E is the subsistence level under which preferences are lexicographic (U l(E) increases with E
only and not c). In a market setting, Baumgärtner et al. (2017b) show that the elasticity of sub-
stitution monotonically increases with income and decreases with the subsistence level. While
Baumgärtner et al. (2017b) focus on the Hicks elasticity of substitution, we focus on the E-P
definition of substitutability since this concept matters in the categorization of environmental
goods. Solving the consumer problem (Eq. 1) with the extended CES function and considering
E to be an environmental public good (as in our framework or in Baumgärtner et al., 2017a),
the indirect utility above the subsistence threshold is given as follows:
V h(Y,E, p) =
(
a
(
Y
p
)1− 1σ
+b (E−E)1− 1σ
) σ
σ−1
. (39)
By deriving eq. (39) with respect to income and environmental quality, we obtain the fol-
lowing expression of indirect substitutability for the extended CES function:
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V hY,E(Y,E, p) =
a b(E−E) 1σ
(
Y
p
) 1
σ
(
b(E−E)1− 1σ +a
(
Y
p
)1− 1σ) σσ−1
σ
(
a(E−E) 1σ Yp +b(E−E)
(
Y
p
) 1
σ
)2 > 0. (40)
Therefore, the extended CES function only allows for complementarity between goods since
E > E. The environment cannot be an inferior good in this framework.
Linear and quasi-linear utility functions Both linear and quasi-linear utility functions,
denoted here by U lin and Uquasilin, imply the separability of private consumption and envi-
ronmental quality. This means that there is an independence, in the sense of E-P, between
these two goods (refer to Definition 3), that is, U linY,E(Y,E) =U
quasilin
Y,E (Y,E) = 0 and therefore
V linY,E(Y,E, p) = V
quasilin
Y,E (Y,E, p) = 0. According to Eq (6), then the income elasticity of the
WTP is necessarily positive, resulting in normal or luxury environmental goods.
From a theoretical standpoint, the most common utility functions rely on the assumption
of complementarity or independence between income and the environment. This means that
the environmental public good is bound to be either a normal or a luxury good. Thus, most
(microeconomic) models do not allow the consumer to consider the environmental good to
be inferior and to switch back and forth from one category to the other when the consumer’s
income (or the environment) changes.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We remind that WT P = VEVY dE and that ε
WT P = ∂WT P∂Y
Y
WT P . Then, the sign of ε
WT P is the same
as the sign of ∂WT P∂Y .
εWT P > 0⇔ ∂WT P
∂Y
> 0 (41)
⇔VY EVY −VYYVE > 0 (42)
⇔ VY E
VE
>
VYY
VY
(43)
⇔−Y VY E
VE
<−Y VYY
VY
(44)
⇔ ηE,Y < ηY,Y (45)
where the elasticity ηY,E measures the impact of a change in income on the marginal satisfac-
tion derived from environmental quality.
We also have
εWT P < 0⇔ ηE,Y > ηY,Y . (46)
34
The sign of the income elasticity of the WTP is opposite to the sign of the difference between
ηE,Y and ηY,Y . For our CDS utility function, it leads to the following conditions:
ηE,Y −ηY,Y > 0⇔
θαβ − γω
(
Y
p
)γ+α
Eω+β
ω
(
Y
p
)γ+α
Eω+β +θβ
−
γ(1− γ)
(
Y
p
)γ+α
Eω+β +θα(α+1)
γ
(
Y
p
)γ+α
Eω+β +θα
> 0
(47)
⇔ Z2(−γω)+Z(θαβγ−θγωα−θγ(1− γ)β −θαω(α+1))−θ 2αβ > 0
(48)
⇔ DZ2+FZ+C > 0 , (49)
with 
Z =
(
Y
p
)γ+α
Eω+β
D =−γω < 0
F = θ(βγ(α+ γ−1)−αω(α+ γ+1))S 0
C =−θ 2αβ < 0
The discriminant of the polynomial P(Z) = DZ2+FZ+C is
∆= θ 2(βγ−αω)[βγ(γ+α−1)2−αω(γ+α+1)2)] , (50)
which is positive if and only if
Condition 1
{
βγ−αω > 0
βγ(γ+α−1)2−αω(γ+α+1)2 > 0 ,
or
Condition 2
{
βγ−αω < 0
βγ(γ+α−1)2−αω(γ+α+1)2 < 0 .
When ∆> 0, the two resulting real roots Z1 = −F+
√
∆
2D and Z2 =
−F−√∆
2D are :
Z1 =
4θβγαω
γω[βγ(γ+α−1)−αω(γ+α+1)+
√
(βγ−αω)(βγ(γ+α−1)2−αω(γ+α+1)2)] (51)
Z2 =
−4θβγαω
γω[αω(γ+α+1)−βγ(γ+α−1)+
√
(βγ−αω)(βγ(γ+α−1)2−αω(γ+α+1)2)] (52)
The sign of the two roots depends on whether condition (1) or condition (2) holds:
• if Condition 1 holds, as αωβγ <
(γ+α−1)2
(γ+α+1)2 ⇒ αωβγ <
γ+α−1
γ+α+1 because
γ+α−1
γ+α+1 < 1, then F > 0
and {
Z1 > 0 since αωβγ <
γ+α−1
γ+α+1
Z2 > 0
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• if Condition 2 holds then, as F < 0,{
Z1 < 0
Z2 < 0 since αωβγ >
γ+α−1
γ+α+1
Negative income elasticity can effectively be obtained only under condition (1). Then, the
income elasticity is negative between the curves of equation Z = Z1 and Z = Z2. Everywhere
else, the income elasticity of the WTP is positive.
B A theoretical framework with an endogenous hierarchical be-
havior
In this appendix, we describe some properties of a utility function that may be satisfied, and
how they can result in a hierarchical behavior when an individual allocates income for the
satisfaction of different needs. When assumed, these properties eliminate degenerate solutions
or provide an interesting structure to our problem.
B.1 Utility properties and hierarchical behavior
We consider two needs, A and B. Utility is denoted by U(cA,cB,E), and it depends on (i) the
consumption of two (groups of) goods cA and cB (with the corresponding prices pA and pB)
that individually contribute to the satisfaction of the corresponding need, A or B, and (ii) the
environmental good E that contributes to the satisfaction of both the needs. The concavity and
separability assumptions made on U in subsection 3.2 are assumed to hold (in particular, we
recall that UcAcB = 0). In addition, we introduce the following properties.
The two needs may be of different importance, and a basic need B will have a lower rank
than an ancillary need A if there is a prevalence of Need B.
Property 1 (Prevalence of Need B) UcB(0,0,E)pB >
UcA(0,0,E)
pA
> 0 for all pB, pA and E ≥ 0.
When Need B prevails over Need A, the first unit of income is spent to satisfy Need B (hence in
consumption cB). A prevalence of Need B implies that the marginal utility from the consump-
tion of Need A-related goods is finite (i.e., UcA(0,0,E)< ∞) and that the marginal utility from
the consumption of Need B-related goods is sufficiently high (depending on the price ratio)
and possibly infinite. In next subsection, we prove that this condition alone generates (partial)
hierarchical behavior for low levels of income.
A basic need could also be satiable in the sense that the marginal utility from its satisfaction
vanishes at some point.
Property 2 (Satiety of Need B) Utility U is satiable on Need B if limcB→∞UcB(cA,cB,E) = 0
for all E.
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If marginal utility vanishes for a finite consumption level, then we would have absolute satiety.
Property 3 (Absolute satiety of Need B) Absolute satiety occurs whenever there is a thresh-
old cˇB(E) such that UcB(cA,cB,E) = 0 for all cB > cˇB(E).
To avoid overall satiety, which may induce an incomplete allocation of the budget over the
two categories of expenditure if no higher-ranked need is considered, one can assume that there
is no absolute satiety of Need A.
Property 4 (Non-absolute satiety of Need A) UcA(cB,cA,E)> 0 for all cA,E ≥ 0.
This represents the fact that there will always be a desire to allocate budget to the highest-
ranked need. The lower bound of marginal utility from the satisfaction of Need A in a given
environmental context E is denoted by µ(E) = inf
cA
UcA(cA,cB,E) ≥ 0. Satiety occurs when
µ(E) = 0.
We also define the strong non-satiety of needs as follows.
Property 5 (Strong non-satiety of Need A) Need A is strongly non-satiable if there is a thresh-
old cˆA(E)< ∞ such that UcA(cA,cB,E) = µ(E)> 0 for all cA ≥ cˆA(E).
In next subsection, we prove that this property, when combined with the satiety of Need B,
induces hierarchical behavior, with the full allocation of marginal income for satisfying the
ancillary need A for high-income levels. This behavior occurs without imposing the absolute
satiety of Need B. The marginal utility from the consumption of cB would still be positive (the
consumer would still derive satisfaction from the additional consumption aimed at satisfying
this need); however, allocating income to the consumption of good cA is preferred. In the liter-
ature (particularly, post-Keynesian consumer choice theory), hierarchical behaviors are usually
imposed through exogenous thresholds, representing the absolute satiety of lower-ranked needs
(Roy, 1943; Kaufman, 1990; Seeley, 1992; Lavoie, 2004). This property is strong and corre-
sponds to the existence of an exogenous threshold (potentially depending on environmental
quality) above which the consumption of good cB does not generate additional utility (the ab-
solute satiety defined in Property 3). After such a level, Need B is fulfilled and income is
allocated to satisfy Need A only. To avoid relying on such exogenous thresholds, we provide
examples based on the assumption of strong non-satiety of Need A.
Strong non-satiety of Need A (Property 5) is illustrated in Fig. 7 and compared with the
hierarchy that would result from the absolute satiety of Need B illustrated in Fig. 8 (for pA =
pB = 1 to ease the visual interpretation).
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cA(E)
B(cB,E)
A(cA,E)
cA, cB
Figure 7: Strong non-satiety of Need A
Figure 8: Absolute satiety of Need B, with
a kink in cˇB
B.2 Consumers’ utility maximization under an endogenous hierarchy
The consumer’s problem is to allocate own budget between the two consumption categories
such that
V (Y,E, pA, pB) ≡ max
cA,cB
U(cA,cB,E) (53)
s.t. Y − pAcA− pBcB ≥ 0 , (54)
cA,cB ≥ 0 , (55)
where V is the indirect utility function, namely the optimal level of utility obtained in a context
(Y,E) and given prices (pA, pB).
The Lagrangian associated with the optimization problem is
L =U(cA,cB,E)+λ (Y − pAcA− pBcB)+µAcA+µBcB, (56)
where
• λ ≥ 0 is the adjoint variable of the budget constraint Y − (pAcA + pBcB) ≥ 0, with the
complementary slackness condition:
λ (Y − pAcA− pBcB) = 0 . (57)
The variable λ = ∂L∂Y can be interpreted as the marginal value of income.
• µA ≥ 0 and µB ≥ 0 are the adjoint variables of the positivity constraints of consumption
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levels cA ≥ 0 and cB ≥ 0, which satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
µAcA = 0 , (58)
µBcB = 0 . (59)
Deriving the first-order conditions, we obtain{
∂L
∂cA
=UcA−λ pA+µA = 0
∂L
∂cB
=UcB−λ pB+µB = 0
Then, equalizing the two expressions of λ ,32 we obtain
UcA +µA
pA
=
UcB +µB
pB
. (60)
In an interior solution, both consumption levels are positive (cA > 0 and cB > 0), and µA =
µB = 0. Marginal utilities satisfy
UcA
pA
=
UcB
pB
. (61)
In such a case, indirect substitutability is given by the expression in Eq. (13).
The corner solution cA > 0 and cB = 0, implying µA = 0 and µB ≥ 0, would lead to UcApA =
UcB+µB
pB
⇒ UcA(cA,0,E)pA ≥
UcB(cA,0,E)
pB
, which is excluded under the prevalence of Need B (Property
1) and the marginal decreasing utility of cA.
The corner solution cA = 0 and cB > 0 implies that µA ≥ 0 and µB = 0, and thus UcA+µApA =
UcB
pB
⇒ UcA(0,cB,E)pA ≤
UcB(0,cB,E)
pB
. This is possible under the prevalence of Need B (Property 1),
at least for sufficiently low levels of income. In such a case, total income is allocated to the
satisfaction of Need B, a case of hierarchical behavior characterized by Proposition 4.33
Proposition 4 (Hierarchy: Lower-ranked need satisfaction) If there is a prevalence of Need
B over Need A (Property 1), then there will be a budget threshold Y (E, pA, pB) under which the
entire budget is allocated to the satisfaction of Need B, that is,
∀Y ≤ Y (E, pA, pB) : c∗B(Y,E, pA, pB) = YpB and c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB) = 0.
If this threshold is finite, then it will satisfy UcB(0,
Y
pB
,E) = pBpAUcA(0,
Y
pB
,E).
Proof of Proposition 4 Assume that UcB(0,0,E)pB >
UcA(0,0,E)
pA
(prevalence of Need B). This is
equivalent to BcB(0,E)pB >
AcA(0,E)
pA
, as the two needs are independent. Given that the function
B(cB,E) is continuous and differentiable, there exists ε > 0 such that
BcB(
ε
pB
,E)
pB
>
AcA(0,E)
pA
. As
32Under Non-absolute satiety of Need A (Property 4), λ > 0.
33In what follows, we may drop (some of) the arguments of functions to ease reading whenever no doubt arises.
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BcBcB < 0, this condition is satisfied for any Y such that
BcB(
Y
pB
,E)
pB
>
AcA(0,E)
pA
. This proves ex-
istence. If for some sufficiently large Y , one has
BcB(
Y
pB
,E)
pB
≤ AcA(0,E)pA (which requires B to be
sufficiently concave in consumption), then the threshold Y (E, pA, pB) will be finite and it will
satisfy
BcB(
Y
pB
,E)
pB
=
AcA(0,E)
pA
, which is equivalent to UcB(0,
Y
pB
,E) = pBpAUcA(0,
Y
pB
,E). This com-
pletes the proof.
Fig. 9 illustrates such a proposition.
pB
Y
B(cB,E)
A(cA,E)
cA, cB
Figure 9: Hierarchy B A (with pA = pB = 1 to ease visual interpretation)
Under the prevalence of Need B, for relatively low-income levels (i.e., Y ≤ Y ), preferences
are such that all income is allocated for satisfying the basic need B. In the case of higher
income, marginal income is allocated jointly for the satisfaction of both the needs according
to the trade-off encompassed in Eq. (61). As the satisfaction of both the needs depends on
environmental quality, the income threshold Y depends on the environmental quality too.
Proposition 5 (Sensitivity of threshold Y to environmental quality) The income threshold Y
decreases (increases) when environmental quality increases if and only if private goods are rel-
atively more (less) substitutable with environmental quality for satisfying the basic need B than
for satisfying the ancillary need A, with the specific condition Y ′(E)< (>)0⇔ UcBEpB < (>)
UcAE
pA
.
Proof of Proposition 5 The threshold Y (E) is defined, for any E, through the equality
UcB(0,
Y
pB
,E) = pBpAUcA(0,
Y
pB
,E). From the definition of the utility function, this equality is
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equivalent to BcB(
Y
pB
,E) = pBpAUcA(0,E). The left- and right-hand sides of this equality are
functions of E, and the equality must be satisfied for all E. Differentiating the two sides with
respect to E, and isolating Y ′(E), yields Y ′(E) = p
2
B
BcBcB
(
AcAE
pA
− BcBEpB
)
. As UcBcB < 0 by assump-
tion, the sign of Y ′(E) is the same as the sign of the difference BcBEpB −
AcAE
pA
, which is equal to
UcBE
pB
− UcAEpA . This completes the proof.
In particular, according to Proposition 5, Y (E) decreases with environmental quality when
there is substitutability between private consumption and the environment for satisfying Need B
(i.e., BcBE < 0) and complementarity between the goods for satisfying Need A (i.e., AcAE > 0).
The mechanism for this case is intuitive and discussed in the main text.
Further, if there is satiety in the satisfaction of the basic need B, then there would be another
income threshold above which marginal income is allocated for satisfying the ancillary need A
only if Need A is strongly non-satiable.34
Proposition 6 (Hierarchy: Higher-ranked need satisfaction) If Need B is satiable (Property
2) and Need A is strongly non-satiable (Property 5), then there will be an income threshold
Y (E) above which all additional income will be allocated for satisfying Need A, that is,
∀Y > Y (E) : dc∗BdY = 0 and
dc∗A
dY =
1
pA
.
Proof of Proposition 6 Assume that Need A is strongly non-satiable. Then, there is a cˆA(E)
such that UcA = µ(E) for all cA ≥ cˆA(E) (Property 5). As UcB is continuous and decreasing to-
ward zero if Need B is satiable (Property 2), there is35 a consumption level c¯B, implicitly defined
by the condition UcB(cˆA(E), c¯B,E) =
pB
pA
µ(E) and such that UcB(cˆA(E),cB,E)<
pB
pA
µ(E) for all
cB > c¯B. Define the income level Y (E) = pAcˆA(E)+ pBc¯B. For this income level, consump-
tion levels cA = cˆA(E) and cB = c¯B satisfy the optimality condition (61) as well as the budget
constraint (57). For any Y > Y (E), marginal income is allocated exclusively to consumption
cA to satisfy the optimality condition (61). Thus, we obtain c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB) =
Y−pBc¯B(E)
pA
for all
Y > Y (E). This completes the proof.
According to Proposition 6, pBc¯B(E) is the largest income allocated for satisfying Need B
(which is effective for incomes above Y (E)).
Propositions 4 and 6 allow us to divide individual behavior into three categories that depend
on the context of the choice. Indirect utility under a hierarchy is of the form:
34This hierarchical result can also be obtained by assuming the absolute satiety of Need B (see Property 3),
along with a kink in the derivative of U with respect to cB, as illustrated in Fig. 8.
35Formally, this level may not be defined. It will, however, be well-defined and strictly positive under the
prevalence of Need B.
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V (Y,E, pA, pB) =

U
(
0, YpB ,E
)
if Y ≤ Y (E)
U(c∗A(Y,E, pA, pB),c
∗
B(Y,E, pA, pB),E) if Y (E)< Y ≤ Y (E)
U
(
Y−pBc¯B(E)
pA
, c¯B(E),E
)
if Y > Y (E).
This expression characterizes behavior with a partial hierarchy of needs, which is endogenous
and depends on the context. It determines three contextual cases in which consumer preferences
are stated differently. When Y ≤ Y (E), all income is allocated to Need B and environmental
preferences are driven by the substitutability of private consumption and the environment for
satisfying that need. For incomes above Y (E), a trade-off between the marginal satisfaction of
needs A and B becomes possible, and environmental preferences depend on the interactions be-
tween private goods and the environment for satisfying both the needs (possibly with opposite
effects). For high-income levels (above Y (E)), expenditure for satisfying Need B no longer de-
pends on Y (but may be influenced by the environment E) and all marginal income is allocated
for satisfying Need A. Environmental preferences are driven by the substitutability of private
consumption and the environment for satisfying that need only.
Finally, let us emphasize that in our endogenous hierarchy framework, for low-income lev-
els (Y ≤ Y (E)), some satisfaction of higher-ranked needs can be derived from the environment
only. This would be the case if AE(0,E) 6= 0. Environmental quality E may contribute to
ancillary needs. For example, children can enjoy leisure activities, such as bathing in a river
or climbing trees in a forest, without using any income. Subsequently, their utility can be
increased by improving environmental quality—even if they have no private consumption re-
lated to this category of needs. The traditional representation of the hierarchy of needs in the
post-Keynesian literature does not allow for such a situation, as it usually assumes that primary
needs must be fulfilled prior to the fulfillment of any other need.
B.3 Particular case with a pure hierarchy
We now provide the derivation of the results for the particular example of the utility function
introduced in Eq. (14):
U(cA,cB,E) = cAEω − θcαB Eβ
.
We have UcA =Eω and UcB =
θβ
cαB E
β−1 , and thus, for all E, UcA(0,0,E) =E
ω <UcB(0,0,E) =∞.
Therefore, there is a prevalence of Need B (Property 1). Moreover, for all cA≥ 0, UcA =Eω > 0,
which means that there is a strong non-satiety of Need A (Property 5). Either Proposition 4
or Proposition 6 can be used to derive the income threshold Y¯ (E, pA, pB) = pB
(
pA
pB
αθ
Eω+β
) 1
α+1
provided in the text.
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